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This paper examines the framing of claims in the Serbian women’s movement and compares these 
frames with the EU enlargement discourse to see if the discourse offers constraints or opportunities 
for movement actors. By distinguishing the framing of diagnosis and prognosis in EU enlargement 
policy, as well as by describing the framing of gender equality in EU policy documents, the EU is 
identified as a potential discursive opportunity structure that can help gain leverage to the claims 
put forth by Serbian women’s organizations. Theoretically, the contribution here is an attempt to 
apply the social movement framing perspective comparatively in studying both movement- and 
policy frames as well as to combine the concept of discursive opportunity structures with frame 
analysis and thus highlight the discursive context of EU accession negotiations for movement 
claims-making. Empirically, the contributions of this paper shed some much-needed light on 
Serbian women’s organizations describing their radical feminist frames and their view of the state 
as the “common enemy”. The analysis indicates several points of resonance between movement and 
policy frames, especially regarding the weak implementation of gender equality legislation and the 
overall lacking political will for change. 
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Introduction 
As of today, several of the former Yugoslav countries are undergoing comprehensive reform 
programs and harmonization to European Union (EU) legislations and politics. Apart from Croatia 
that has already accomplished EU membership, Serbia was qualified a candidate country in 2012 
and is in the midst of accession negotiations, a phase of “transformative power” (Haughton 2007). 
Previous research has indicated that the EU accession context can have great impacts for local 
women’s NGOs (Roth 2007). Given that the EU has been identified as an important political 
opportunity structure for social movements (Marks & McAdam 2009), the question arises of if and 
how the EU can facilitate the strengthening of the Serbian women’s movements claims. Being in 
the middle of a transformation- and reconciliation process, Serbia is an interesting country to study 
in relation to the EU and women's activism. During the wars of the 1990s’ that resulted from the 
disintegration of the Yugoslavian regime, women started mobilizing against the evolving militarism 
and nationalism, despite the increasing focus on ethnic and racial differences (Lukic 2011). Several 
scholars have drawn links between emerging Yugoslav feminist groups of the 1970s, the peace 
activism that followed the outbreak of the wars and contemporary civic engagement in the ex-
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Yugoslav region (Milic 2004; Bilic & Jankovic 2012; Visnjic 2015). This study engages with the 
cultural dimension in social movement theory by comparing the framing efforts among Serbian 
women’s organizations, on the one hand, with those of the EU, on the other hand, and thus analyzes 
if their framing of problems (diagnosis) and solutions (prognosis) are mutually supportive. This is 
interesting to explore for several reasons: Firstly, against the background of increased nationalism 
and right-wing mobilization(s) in Europe in general, where women’s organizations are important 
reactions to this development (cf. Ferree & McClurg Mueller 2004). Secondly, since international 
NGOs and foundations are leaving the area, a fact that indicates the significance of EU as a political 
actor as well as a potential donor for the Serbian women’s movement. Thirdly, little is known about 
contemporary women’s organizing in Southeastern Europe, especially in relation to EU 
enlargement policy. The aim with this paper is to assess whether the framing of the EU can help 
gain leverage to the frames brought forth by women’s organizations in Serbia. Thus, the framing of 
claims by both Serbian women’s organizations and the EU enlargement discourse will be 
highlighted in order to analyze their possible convergence by answering following research 
questions: (1) How do movement actors in different Serbian women’s organizations frame their 
claims? And (2) to what extent does the EU enlargement discourse provide discursive opportunities 
for the women’s movement in Serbia? What are the possibilities for frame resonance? Hopefully, 
this paper can contribute to an understanding of the impact of the EU for the Serbian women’s 
movement; especially regarding the discursive reach of goals related to the social dimension of EU 
integration politics. Below, I will briefly outline some basic developments regarding the EU 
enlargement context and EU gender equality policies. 
 
The EU Enlargement Agenda and the Scope of Its Gender Equality Policy 
Within the context of the EU enlargement agenda, there is no separate policy on gender equality 
that applies to candidate countries. Instead, the accession negotiations require Serbia to fulfill 
economic, political and administrative/institutional criteria’s as well as adopt all of the 35 chapters 
within the legislative framework of Acquis Communitaire (Acquis) in which the development 
concerning gender equality is monitored under chapter 19 (Employment and Social Policy) and 
chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights). The legally binding measures in the area of gender 
equality are reflected in these chapters of which most directives are related to equal pay as well as 
equal opportunities in relation to employment. Outside the field of employment, there is only one 
directive that applies to the inequality between women and men, the directive (Directive 2004/113) 
on the equal treatment of men and women in the access to and the supply of goods and services 
(Burri & Prechal 2010). Furthermore, there exist several non-binding or “soft” policy instruments 
that can be integrated in enlargement policy. Questions of discrimination are generally treated under 
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the framework of “fundamental rights”, as also reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which includes one article on non-discrimination (Article 21) and one article on gender equality 
(Article 23) (EU 2012). Moreover, the Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015 
includes a chapter on the promotion of gender equality in all “external actions” stressing that 
candidate countries must embrace the “fundamental principle of equality between women and men” 
because it should remain “a priority of the enlargement process” (COM 2010a). Another soft law 
document is the EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in 
Development 2010-2015 (COM 2010b), launched as a means to reinforce the implementation of 
gender equality policies, both within member states as well as with partner countries. However, the 
enlargement context is not mentioned explicitly here, which makes this document ambiguous with 
regards to how far-reaching it is. While it does declare gender equality and women’s empowerment 
as important objectives to achieve within EU development cooperation, the gender action plan fails 
to acknowledge the same goals within the enlargement context. As of 1996 gender mainstreaming 
has been the official strategy to pursue gender equality and was introduced in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam where the new amended Article 3.2 states that in all activities “the Community shall 
aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women” (COM 1996). 
Thus, one could contend that even though the gender action plan fails to cover the enlargement 
agenda, a gender perspective should permeate the whole enlargement discourse. In sum, the EU has 
adopted important strategies and objectives regarding its gender equality policy, but it is unclear to 
what extent above mentioned “soft” measures are incorporated within the conditions that candidate 
countries must meet and to what extent the enlargement agenda is being gender mainstreamed.  
 
Research Overview 
Previous research on women’s organizing in post-communist contexts has focused mainly on 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), while less is known about the role of women’s movements in 
Southeastern Europe. Especially, there is limited knowledge on contemporary women’s organizing 
in relation to EU enlargement policy and few have analyzed the impact of EU candidacy from a 
social movement framing perspective. These are research gaps that this paper intends to fill. 
Nevertheless, this section will present some important perspectives brought up in earlier research. 
 
Local Women’s Organizations and EU Enlargement 
Previous research has indicated an ambivalent picture in terms of what the context of EU accession 
might do to facilitate the work of women’s movements (e.g. Roth 2007; Haskova & Krizkova 
2008). Among others, Roth (2007:479) argues that the EU accession process in CEE countries was 
contradictory in its way of offering political and economic opportunities to local NGOs while at the 
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same time the process in itself was disadvantageous to smaller organizations that lost funding and 
were constrained in their activities. Likewise, Rek (2010:67f) has highlighted that the “top-down” 
process of EU fosters “short-term project oriented” type of organizations, favoring larger and better-
organized civil society organizations (CSOs). The results can be quite severe as other international 
foundations leave the area when EU becomes the main donor (cf. Sloat 2005:441). Another 
Europeanization effect found in the literature, that applies to candidate countries as well, is how the 
EU encourages civil society actors to get institutionalized and professionalized rather than to 
perform “traditional” protest action (e.g. Cisar & Vráblíková 2010). Many scholars have used the 
concept of political opportunity structures to clarify that dynamics of social movement activity are 
under effect of the European integration politics because the EU integration process constitutes 
something new with regards to “shaking” the institutional power of the nation-state (Marks & 
McAdam 2009:98). Thus, it has been concluded that the capacity of a social movement often 
depends on its success with regards to forming transnational coalitions, which is especially 
important for movements that are constrained by domestic political opportunity structures. Keck & 
Sikkink (1999:5), for instance, have used the metaphor of boomerang patterns to illustrate the ways 
in which local NGOs can use transnational actors, such as the EU, to influence their national 
governments or empower their cause. In the case of the Czech Republic, Cisar and Vráblíková 
(2010) noted the positive impact of the EU, describing how the interests of women’s organizations 
and the EU converged once the accession negotiations started. There is also evidence of the unique 
opportunity for change offered through what has been called EU conditionality, but Haughton 
(2007) has argued that the “transformative power” of the EU is largest during the initial phase of the 
accession negotiations, hence stressing the delicate nature of the opportunities and constraints the 
EU can offer domestic actors. The above-cited theorists all focus on the economic and political 
opportunities that the EU has to offer, while the discursive aspects of the EU accession process have 
been much less illuminated. Nevertheless, Bretherton (2011) has criticized the EU for the lack of 
implementation of gender mainstreaming during the pre-accession period. Analyzing the accession 
negotiations in ten CEE countries, she indicates that focus lied on the legal aspects of Acquis as well 
as “institutional compliance”, which hindered a full policy influence in the area of gender equality. 
This is in line with the feminist critique of EU bureaucracy, where Stratigaki (2004) among others 
has argued that gender equality is a contested concept that tends to get co-opted, a process whereby 
gender equality objectives transform and adjust to other policy goals, thus becoming depoliticized. 
Bearing in mind that the EU monitors Serbia above all from the point of implementing the “hard” 
law contained in Acquis, it remains to be seen how the “softer” policy concerning gender equality is 
applied in the Serbian accession context.  
 
 5 
Women’s Organizing in Serbia 
In socialist Yugoslavia, women experienced “formal” gender equality even though equal rights 
were mostly tied to employment and it was only a minority of women who were actually active in 
the labor force (Morokvasic 1998:73-75). In practice, many women, especially in rural areas, were 
tied to domestic work and traditional gender relations. Still, the transformation process beginning in 
1989 meant that women disappeared from the public scene and that women’s position worsened 
(Ibid). This reflects similar tendencies as in CEE countries where women generally experienced a 
disappointment after 1989 as their economic and social status gained during communism weakened 
(e.g. Pollert 2003). However, in socialist Yugoslavia self-proclaimed feminist groups emerged 
rather early as a result of the more open borders compared to other former communist countries, 
which allowed the influence of Western feminist ideas (Hughes et al. 1995:512). In the late 1970s, 
feminist intellectuals from the urban centers of Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana created the 
autonomous group Women & Society, whose meetings have been described as academic debates. It 
was only later, in the period preceding the wars, that grassroots activism emerged, as these feminists 
needed to confront the proposed reductions of reproductive rights (Zarkov 2003:2). In general, 
literature on Yugoslav women’s activism tends to highlight its connections to feminist theory, Lukic 
(2011:7) describing it as a “strategic alliance”.  
With war and its aftermath, the post-Yugoslav countries saw an “NGO-boom” in the first 
half of the 1990s (Bagic 2006). Yugoslav women played a central role in the peace activism of the 
1990s (Morokvasic 1998; Lukic 2011). This peace activism took two shapes, on the one hand a 
“mothers protest” that started during the summer of 1991 and on the other hand existing feminist 
activism that started shifting towards an anti-war agenda (Hughes et al. 1995). Slapsak (2008:130f) 
argues that since then (1990s) Serbian women were perceived as “traitors” and gender politics in a 
Serbian context is generally interwoven with questions of how to relate to the committed war 
crimes. The study of the women’s movement in Serbia inevitably brings forth the topic of war and 
nationalism. While contemporary women’s groups and NGOs in Serbia seem, to some extent, 
comprised of women’s networks originating in the socialist period of Yugoslavia (Milic 2004) or 
from the beginning of the 1990s when many new organizations arose as parts of the anti-war 
sentiments and as reactions to humanitarian crisis (Hughes et al. 1995), there is not much up to date 
research on the characteristics of the contemporary Serbian women’s movement. Recent, more 
critical accounts have been offered by Miskovska (2014) arguing that the concept of feminism in a 
Yugoslav context presupposes an identity as “anti-nationalist” and still, the very ways in which 
feminists create boundaries between who is defined a nationalist and who is not, can be 
problematic. Therefore, identity formations along gender and ethnic lines seem to be important for 
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the way injustice is framed among Serbian women’s groups. However, there is a lack of knowledge 
on the claims of contemporary Serbian post-war and post-socialist women’s groups. In particular, 
few have analyzed the Serbian women’s movement from a social movement framing approach and 
there is limited research on what the enlargement agenda for Serbia entails for local women’s 
organizations, a dearth that this study aims to redress.  
 
Theoretical framework 
This paper employs framing analysis in order to understand meaning construction in Serbian 
women’s organizations as well as in EU policy. Thus, the notion of framing is used to understand 
how movement actors frame their claims, while the notions of resonance and discursive opportunity 
structures are used to analyze the correspondence of policy vs. movement frames. In this way I try 
to account for both structural (contextual) factors as well as agency in the analysis of a social 
movement.  
 
Comparative Frame Analysis 
The framing concept is often employed in social movement research to describe how movements 
mobilize about conflictual issues. Framing is here seen as a process of meaning construction and 
movement actors are viewed as “signifying agents” (Benford & Snow 2000). According to Benford 
& Snow, movement actors produce collective action frames by being involved in struggle(s) over 
the production of ideas and meanings that help mobilize potential adherents. Collective action 
frames are thus the result of interactive processes where individuals are negotiating shared meaning 
(2000:614). In the course of this framing process, movement participants produce frames through 
identifying a problem and/or a situation in need of change (diagnostic frames), identification of 
possible solutions to the problem (prognostic frames) and by different “vocabularies of motive” 
urge people to act (motivational frames) (Benford & Snow 2000). Following this, the notion of 
frames and framing is suitable also in analyzing policy documents. The exploration of movement 
frames in relation to policy frames is useful since few have used the framing perspective 
comparatively, as Benford & Snow (2000:618) state in their research overview.  
As argued by Ferree & Merrill (2000), frames and framing processes should be analytically 
distinguished from discourse and from ideologies. Their conceptual elaboration is useful to clarify 
the micro and macro connections between interrelated concepts such as frames, ideologies and 
discourses. In their criticism of how the framing perspective has been applied in movement 
research, they define discourses as “broad systems of communication that link concepts together in 
a web of relationships through an underlying logic” (2000:455). Ideologies are understood as 
distinguished by their cognitive as well as normative components since Ferree & Merrill (2000) 
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underscore that ideologies function as theories about the nature of social life (cognitive) but also 
incorporate values and norms (normative). Frames are comprised of cognitive ideas in that frames 
specify how to think about an issue, and are not – as ideologies – involved with the estimation of 
why it matters to think about things in a specific way (Ibid). Framing processes, on the other hand, 
is what connects the above-mentioned interlinked concepts (2000:455-456). In line with this, focus 
is put not only on the specific frames themselves but also on the framing process as a whole in order 
to account for underlying motivations in the production of specific frames (2000:457).  
 
Discursive Opportunity Structures and Resonance 
The notion of discursive opportunities has evolved as a way to capture the discursive conditions 
that facilitate movement outcomes. While the notion of political opportunities has been used to 
describe how political context matters for movement activity, McCammon (2013) argues that 
neither the political opportunity theory nor the framing theory has sufficiently explained the role of 
cultural dynamics in movement outcomes. The term discursive opportunity structures can be used 
for precisely this; to capture how the “cultural elements in the broader environment facilitate and 
constrain successful movement framing” (Ibid). As for the characteristics of such opportunities, 
McCammon et al (2007) maintain that the influence of frames depends on the cultural environments 
in which they occur pointing out that successful frames are those that resonate within the discourse 
and larger cultural environment. Such frames are also more likely to be successful in achieving their 
goals. Ferree (2003) has here argued that not all movement participants seek resonance with the 
dominant discourse, as movement groups can choose to be radical or resonant in their framing. The 
success of movement frames certainly depends on their resonance in the wider cultural context, but 
that in turn depends on the degree to which movement actors seek to be strategic in their framing. 
The frames that resonate with a discursive structure will “tap into the vocabulary, underlying 
principles, and narratives of salient discourses in the broader cultural environment” (2003:306). As 
power dynamics exists within social movements, movement actors that do seek resonance tend to 
downplay the needs of more disadvantaged organizations within the movement. Activist ideas can 
thus take certain directions depending on the choices of movement actors, which are in turn always 
constrained in their framing by existent structures (Ferree 2003:309). Consequently, this inquiry 
will link the framing perspective to discursive opportunities in analyzing whether the EU works as a 
discursive opportunity structure for Serbian women’s organizations. The presumption here is that if 
policy frames resonate with movement frames that would create discursive opportunities for 




Data and Methods 
As this study is interested in comparing the framing exerted within two different contexts, the 
chosen data is twofold: qualitative interviews with representatives from Serbian women’s 
organizations as well as a text analysis of relevant EU policy documents. Below, I discuss these 
methodological procedures. 
 
Qualitative Semi-Structured Interviews and Textual Analysis 
During a field trip to Serbia in March 2015, the majority (nine) interviews were conducted face-to-
face with respondents from different Serbian women’s organizations and two interviews were 
carried out through Skype for practical reasons. The interviews were semi-structured and addressed 
themes such as goals and strategies, the perceived impact of EU candidacy, the Serbian political 
context and future hopes. Interviews were chosen, rather than organizational documents, as the goal 
was to get a deeper understanding of movement claims and different organizations’ way of 
reasoning. Prior to the field trip, informal interviews were made with two field representatives from 
Kvinna till Kvinna1 as a way to gain knowledge of the local context. This enabled contact details to 
the main organizations that Kvinna till Kvinna cooperates with. Each organization was then 
researched further; when websites or Facebook pages were available I made sure to try to find out 
more about a particular organization online. It should be noted here that my understanding of a 
women’s movement is focused on organizations that mobilize about conflictual issues (cf. Della 
Porta & Diani 1999:16) with the particular aim of promoting gender equality and advancing 
women's position in society (Spehar 2012). Thus, in selection of participants, I put emphasis on 
organizations that are explicitly involved with social change and effort was made to include a 
variety of women’s organizations considering their location, size and focus (cf. Marshall & 
Rossman 2011). As I relied on my contacts with Kvinna till Kvinna, respondents were mainly found 
through so-called “convenience sampling” (Marshall & Rossman 2011:111) and through 
information on organizations enlisted in the network for European Women’s Lobby,2 an umbrella 
organization comprising nineteen different women’s organizations, all of which were contacted and 
asked for participation (however, many were currently inactive). A majority of the respondents 
were founders of their organizations. The interviews were conducted and transcribed in Serbian, but 
have been cited in English. In this process, the aim was to transpose the central message rather than 
the precise meaning, which I find more accurate since language is culturally situated.  
                                                
1 Kvinna till Kvinna is a foundation supporting women’s NGOs (http://kvinnatillkvinna.se/en/about-us) 
2 Founding members are among others: Novi Sad Lesbian Organization, Women in Black, Autonomous Women’s Centre 
2 Founding members are among others: Novi Sad Lesbian Organization, Women in Black, Autonomous Women’s Centre 
and Out of Circle Vojvodina – all part of this study.  
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The second part of the empirical material is comprised of the latest progress report for 
Serbia (2014) and the latest enlargement strategy (2014-2015). These are the main documents that 
the COM employs to monitor Serbian accession negotiations and will sufficiently reflect the frames 
and discourse of current EU enlargement policy towards Serbia. Strategy papers are more 
comprehensive in terms of policy recommendations and provide conclusions of Serbia’s 
advancement towards EU, while progress reports are more technical in nature, analyzing each 
Acquis chapter in great detail. The focus of EU financial support to Serbia is based on these 
documents identifying key issues Serbia needs to continue improving to meet EU standards.  
 
Ethical Considerations, Reflexivity and Analytical Strategy 
All respondents were informed of the aim of the study and guaranteed anonymity, in line with the 
guidelines by the Swedish Research Council (2002). As a Kvinna till Kvinna-activist, I gained the 
trust of my respondents who were aware of my feminist sympathies. Additionally, perceived as a 
“Swedish feminist” I was more or less seen as an outsider, which was probably positive since the 
respondents might otherwise have presumed certain knowledge or positioning’s on my behalf. I was 
careful to point out that the investigation was detached from my activism in Kvinna till Kvinna 
explaining that the choice of topic mainly had to do with my interest in my Yugoslav background. 
Nevertheless, the fact that many of the organizations studied identified as feminist might be telling 
for the fact that Kvinna till Kvinna sponsored 8 out of 11. The results of this study will thus not be 
generalized to portraying the “whole” movement; rather, the findings discussed below might instead 
contribute to an understanding of feminist organizing in Serbia. At the same time, earlier research 
supports my results since the history of the Serbian women’s movement has been described as 
linked to feminism (Hughes et al 1995).  
After the interviews were carefully transcribed and the policy documents were selected, the 
data was coded and analyzed. The approach here is best described as abductive since there was a 
continuous alternation between theory and empirics. The interviews were analyzed in two stages, 
first through an open coding where I made notes of frequently used phrases, and secondly with the 
theoretical concepts in framing analysis as orientating notions. Each organization was seen as 
having it’s own frames (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational) and discursive logic. The analytic 
focus for the policy documents was comparative; focus lied on how gender equality as well as 
social change was framed in relation to the frames produced within the movement. In both 
materials’ discursive statements were seen as the analytical units. As the chosen policy documents 
were technically detailed and textually heavy, a comparative frame analysis was at times hard to 
perform. Considering the fact that my approach has some similarities to discourse analysis, a 
comprehensive frame analysis of the policy documents would have been too ambitious. Instead, the 
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analysis focused on points of possible resonance identifying were policy documents indicated 
similar/dissimilar framing of diagnosis/prognosis. The theoretical concepts allowed for the policy 
analysis to focus both on micro (gender equality frames) and macro (discursive opportunities) level, 
which required nuanced observations of statements rather than a large amount of data.  
 
Results 
Below, the results will be presented accordingly: the first section describes the framing processes 
within the Serbian women’s movement answering the first research question. The second section 
compares these frames with EU enlargement policy on points of possible resonance and lastly the 
implications of EU discourse are discussed in order to answer the second research question.  
 
The Framing of Claims by Movement Actors 
Most Serbian women’s organizations studied identified as feminists and formulated their political 
claims in great accordance with each other. Portraying militarism and nationalism as the main 
problems was a common feature and an intersecting issue to the movement as a whole. Violence 
against women was the main focus area and was continuously connected to what was described as a 
repressive state politics, a framing process in which the respondents also accentuated a continuation 
of a war-like social situation. Despite these similarities with regards to diagnosis, some tendencies 
of differences in formulation of a solution (prognosis) were distinguished reflecting a generational 
divide. Still, the main result points to the older organizations that arose as part of the anti-war 
protests as having a structuring effect on contemporary women’s activist claims.  
 
The Serbian Women’s Movements Origin in Feminist Anti-war Activism 
Interviews with some of the oldest organizations revealed their point of departure as feminist 
activists engaged in the anti-war and anti-nationalist protests and uprisings of the time. One of these 
organizations was the Autonomous Women’s Centre (AWC) that was formed in 1993 in Belgrade 
thanks to funding from a Swiss women’s association. The Centre emerged from earlier volunteer 
organizing of women in connection to increased violence, namely the group Belgrade SOS hotline 
for Women and Children Victims of Violence (Hughes & Foster 1996). AWC are nowadays known 
for their lobbying to combat violence against women and the organization also exerts a coordinating 
function for similar women’s organizations across Serbia. Another organization that has had a 
structuring effect on the focus areas of the women’s movement is Women in Black (WIB), one of 
the most well-known anti-war groups formed in 1991 to protest the wars (Mladenovic & Litricin 
1993). Several overlapping tendencies existed between activists in these organizations as women 
involved in AWC were often also part of WIB (Hughes & Foster 1996). Ties existed also between 
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international women’s peace initiatives and WIB who from the very start protested the “patriarchal 
and sexist essence of nationalism and war” (Mladenovic & Litricin 1993:116). Additionally, a 
Women’s Studies Centre was formed in Belgrade in 1992, originating from the same feminist anti-
war protestors. The organization Dah Theatre Research Centre was formed in 1991 and connected 
theatre and artistic development with opposition to war and violence. As some of the oldest 
organizations in the field, these organizations embody a clear agenda for change influenced by their 
early anti-war mobilization(s). Other organizations focusing on domestic violence emerged later 
(typically around the 2000s) across Serbia and offer SOS help lines. Additionally, two organizations 
are part of this study but do not work with issues of domestic violence per se: Novi Sad Lesbian 
Organization (NLO) and Women’s Space. These can be described as more identity-oriented 
organizations focusing on empowerment of the lesbian and Roma population respectively. The 
close ties between different feminist groups that existed in the beginning of the 1990s seem to be 
accurate for today’s movement as well, which is reflected in their framing of claims.  
 
Framing the Problem: Patriarchal Violence, Militarism and Nationalism 
A majority of respondents were from organizations mobilizing to combat violence against women. 
Within this faction of activism, 3 there was great accordance in framing the problem, violence 
against women, as a result of patriarchy and uneven (gender) power relations. Moreover, the main 
diagnostic framing among movement actors, and this was not specific to organizations involved 
with the issue of domestic violence, includes pointing to connections between gender violence in 
the private sphere and dominant state politics that legitimates militarism and nationalism and thus 
indirectly reproduces a normalization of all types of violence. The discursive framing of problems 
in contemporary movement claims making thus seems connected to the feminist opposition against 
the wars of the 1990s (Bilic & Jankovic 2012; Visnjic 2015), as they revolved around demarcations 
against militarism and nationalism: 
 
So we are indeed in the same crisis situation as in the 90s…not much has changed. As our friends 
from Women in Black would say, “the absence of war doesn’t mean that peace exists”. Because 
there still exists a normalization of violence here. And women are most often hit hardest by this. 
(Women’s Studies BG)  
 
That moment [outbreak of war] the state did send the message that violence is the only way to solve 
problems. Today we have an enormous amount of women being killed, Femicide. This is possible 
                                                
3 All organizations (AWC, NGO Pescanik, Out of circle, SOS Women’s Centre and SOS Sombor) are part of the network 
“Women against domestic violence”, which is an important channel for cooperation. Activities of these organizations 
comprise preventive educational work with young women and men, alongside the direct help to battered women 
through offering psychological as well as legal counselling. Activities were also characterized by providing services to 
women with experience of partner-related violence through SOS helplines or consultative talks.  
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because of the different types of weapons allowed in the home due to militarization…, which, ever 
since the wars, has only continued and moved into the private homes. (AWC)  
 
Thus, the respondents shared a broad understanding of the term “violence”. All movement actors 
directed severe criticism towards state politics and the current Serbian government, a criticism that 
was sometimes articulated to denote a structure of “political violence” or of Serbia being caught in a 
“circle of violence”. The respondents thus embodied an understanding of the transition to peace as 
failed considering that most of them mentioned militarism and nationalism as the most predominant 
problems of Serbian contemporary society, drawing connections between the continuity of a war-
like situation and a prevailing patriarchal culture. The point of departure in their reasoning was the 
presumed correlation between increasing nationalism and a decrease of women’s rights, which was 
consistently related to the recent wars in the region. This is also in line with the arguments of 
Croatian feminist Ivekovic (1993:114f) who described the war in former Yugoslavia as a 
masculinist nationalist project in which “women” were the first to experience the process of 
“othering”. A tendency within the movement discourse on defining the problems of Serbian society 
was to highlight their activism as a reaction and opposition to mainstream narratives around the 
issue of war as “denying the past”, not taking “full responsibility” or having “unresolved issues with 
the past”. Respondents from some of the anti-war oriented organizations stated:  
 
Above all, the unresolved political themes, the crimes committed in our names during the war in 
1990s. That means, the silence and the constant flirting with the perpetrators on behalf of the state. 
The only way to stop these nationalist and xenophobic forces is to have a clear political ideology 
when it comes to dealing with the past, that is: an identification and responsibility of the crimes 
committed. (Dah Theatre)  
 
The production of the “other” is always a continuation of war. […] From then on (1991) there is 
this same goal of all regimes. To silence critical voices, especially the ones related to Serbian 
accountability for the wars, both of the Milosevic regime at that time, but also today… the lacking 
political accountability that leads to a discouragement of alternative views about the wars. A 
criminalization of solidarity. (WIB)  
 
WIB was among the first organizations to center the diagnostic framing on themes of war and the 
inability of Serbia to take accountability for the past. This organization has been highlighted as a 
particularly important anti-war group who played a fundamental role in resisting the prevailing 
Serbian “culture of denial” (Fridman 2011:509). Their feminist framing of a continuation of a 
militarist political climate ever since the 1990s has shaped the way in which many of the 
organizations attribute guilt in formulation of their claims, thus it could be deemed a “master frame” 
(Benford & Snow 1992). As Benford and Snow (1992) argue, master frames come in “cycles” of 
protest affecting and constraining the framing process of other organizations that are part of the 
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same movement. In a Serbian context, this diagnostic framing, related to accountability for the 
wars, can in fact be understood as a re-framing activity (cf. Benford & Snow 2000), as the 
respondents are actually involved in a conscious process of creating alternative ways of viewing the 
recent past, thus contrasting the tendency of the political parties to avoid the subject of war.4  
 
Framing the Problem: Corruption and Marginalization  
Some of the respondents tended to get disillusioned when asked about the conditions of their 
activism. They described the prevalence of corruption, which was in turn linked to on the one hand 
a stagnating economy and on the other the short period of democracy in the region. All respondents 
exemplified these un-democratic tendencies by witnessing to a marginalization of their political 
claims and a general lack of co-operation with the state. Thus, their navigation towards state politics 
as corrupt and un-democratic was the second most apparent diagnostic framing. The respondents 
affirmed that there is no general knowledge on women’s rights issues and no “real” political will to 
improve the position of women. This diagnostic frame was manifested through several examples of 
government corruption in which the respondents brought forth that the government as well as 
different political parties has “their own” NGOs that they support so as to become the extensions of 
their politics. Hence, respondents provided me with the latest example of state corruption in relation 
to civil society:  
 
We had this instance recently, where the minister for social affairs financed his own NGOs. The 
sum to be distributed was huge, aimed for the civil society sector, and many women’s NGOs had the 
ability to seek these grants. However, it was revealed that the NGOs that received the grants sum 
were founded some 2 days before the grant was announced! You see? … And then when everyone 
started raising questions, he decided to withdraw all the money and transfer it to a foundation for 
children’s diseases. (NGO Pescanik) 
 
Several respondents also accentuated the governments “double face”, on the one hand establishing 
mechanisms for gender equality but on the other never dealing with the threats and hate crimes 
experienced by many women’s rights activists (Dah Theatre; WIB; Out of Circle). Also, AWC 
asserted that they have experienced allegations of being “foreign agents” because of their 
cooperation’s with women’s foundations and organizations outside of Serbia. All respondents 
stressed that the EU accession process has meant ratification of relevant treaties related to gender 
equality, yet no implementation of these agreements has taken place, several respondents using the 
                                                
4 The current party in power is the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), a national conservative party with roots in the 
Serbian Radical Party (SRS) that was formed in conjuncture with the wars and is usually described as a nationalist 
right-wing party. For an analysis of SRS, see Irvine, J. & Lilly, C. (2007). Boys Must be Boys: Gender and the Serbian 
Radical Party, 1991-2000. Nationalities Papers. 35(1), 93-120. They argue that SRS succeeded in shaping the transition 
period towards nationalism and a retraditionalisation of gender roles by promoting a popular “political nostalgia”.   
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metaphor “cosmetic change” to describe this (WIB; Out of Circle, Women’s Studies BG; SOS 
Women’s Centre). Furthermore, a general indifference towards politics among Serbs was conceived 
as a problem, a problem for which the politicians were attributed blame. This was referred to as a 
“lack of dialogue in all segments of society” (NGO Pescanik) or as a form of state-issued violence 
towards Serbian citizens; “I think that what is happening here is state violence towards its citizens” 
(SOS Sombor). According to respondents, the politicians in power have roots in fascist groupings 
and allow a discriminatory culture towards all those deemed different. In addition to flirting with 
fascist right-wing groups, most respondents highlighted that the current government also supports 
the Orthodox Church, a contentious issue for the women’s movement because of its link to the 
question of abortion (AWC). In fact, respondents saw abortion as an unquestionable right and in the 
same vein delineated their activism from involvement in women’s NGOs aiming to “preserve the 
Serbian culture”; such organizations were considered nationalist (AWC; WIB; Women’s Studies 
BG, Women’s Studies NS). Consequently, there is some evidence to a split between factions of 
NGOs  - those identifying as feminists and those employing other claims, for example in relation to 
abortion or on standpoints related to “nationalism”. However, the shared frames among the 
respondents of this study reveal a common ground in relation to feminism and it is this very 
identification that puts them in a marginalized position vis-à-vis the government. One respondent 
provided an illuminating example:  
 
When we wanted to mark the anniversary of our Centre, we received some funding when we wrote 
that we wanted to make an investigation marking the life of some professors at this university, but 
not the first time we applied, when we explicitly formulated in the application that it was about the 
work of the Gender Studies Centre. (Women’s Studies NS) 
 
Framing the Solution: Feminist Solidarity, Non-violence and Reconciliation 
As the master frame within the movement was a contrasting of nationalism and militarism to 
feminism, it is not surprising that most of the solutions were articulated with reference to feminism. 
All respondents expressed the wish to cooperate with any women’s organization that shares their 
over-arching goals in relation to women’s discrimination. As domestic violence was seen as a 
question of gender oppression the main prognosis, in addition to providing direct help and social 
services to battered women, was related to empowerment, awareness-raising and different 
preventive measures and educational programs directed towards the general public as well as 
governmental agencies and authorities. These measures were sometimes also directed towards 
women in a “particularly vulnerable position”, such as rural women or women in Roma 
communities (NGO Pescanik; Women’s Space). Furthermore some organizations outside the field 
of domestic violence sought specifically to highlight the multiple discriminations women 
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experience, and their prognostic framing was above all related to spreading knowledge surrounding 
the specifics of this discrimination, be it lesbian, Roma- or women with disabilities (NLO; 
Women’s Space; Out of Circle; Women’s Studies NS). Interestingly, as previously stated, many 
respondents referred to violence against women in their framing, not only those involved in 
organizations to combat domestic violence. As violence against women on micro (private sphere) 
and macro (through nationalist politics) level were interpreted as violations to the bodily integrity of 
women, respondents sought to frame this violence as a social problem in line with (radical) feminist 
framings of “patriarchal structures” (Gemzöe 2002). Thus, the prognosis revolved around a 
discourse of non-violence and awareness-rising activities was on the agenda of every organization.  
The divergence with regards to diagnostic and prognostic framing seem related to a 
generational gap as well as a tension between grass-roots activism and what was defined as 
“mainstream activism”, i.e. organizations that are more professionalized in terms of organizational 
structure (cf. Vráblíková & Cisar 2010). The generational divide was expressed firstly through 
some of the older organizations (and respondents) being clearer on “dealing with the past” and 
reconciliation as the main solution (WIB; AWC; DAH Theatre), while some of the younger 
organizations focused on women’s rights per see conveying a more forward-looking analysis (SOS 
Women’s Centre; NLO; SOS Sombor; Women’s Space). Their agenda was less directed towards 
topics such as the genocide in Srebrenica, war criminals and other symbolic political issues. 
Similarly, some of the older organizations expressed frustration concerning the need to fight for the 
same issues all over again, carrying certain “Yugo-nostalgia”. The same respondents mentioned the 
gender pay gap and women’s discrimination in the labor market as a relatively “new” type of 
problem (Women’s Studies BG; AWC). NLO consisted of, in contrast to many of the other 
organizations, non-hierarchical grass-roots activists that strived to create a “safe space” for the 
lesbian population of Novi Sad. They indicated, together with a respondent from Out of Circle, that 
the “mainstream” activism of Belgrade-organizations receives all the funding and is donor-driven, 
thus demarcating against the tendency of organizations to act opportunistic and adjust to available 
frames and opportunities. The case of NLO is interesting as they, more than others, frame their 
cause as “true activism” claiming to be marginalized by donors since they are a small organization 
and occasionally marginalized within the movement since they try to raise questions of multiple 
discriminations. In general, the younger organizations (2000s) as well as activists seemed more 
inclined to include multiple discriminations as part of their diagnostics and were less articulate 





Framing the Motivations: Feminist Cooperation, Transnationalism and a “European” Belonging  
Above all, movement actors motivated their struggle in terms of the need for social change, as the 
repressive politics of the Serbian government was defined if not downright fascist, then at least 
“non-democratic”. In line with this, the respondents longed for “a more open Serbia”, “ethics of 
responsibility”, “alternative discourse”, “a break with the cultural isolation” and so on. As shown 
above, there was a clear “we” here, a presupposed feminist identity. Many respondents were 
convinced that they, as women’s NGOs, were the only ones pursuing change:  
 
For these issues, even before the 1990s, women are the ones handling this. The struggle for peace, 
for anti-nationalism and anti-militarism. Dealing with the past, that concept has not been 
highlighted in any serious way outside the civil society sector. (Women’s Studies BG)  
 
“Speaking truth to power”. That is basically what we try to do. And it is very interesting, all 
women’s NGOs or NGOs consisting only of women… It seems as if only women are interested in 
societal transformations. (Dah Theatre)  
 
These quotations illustrate that they see themselves as the ones who try “dealing with the past”.  
Describing a political, economic and discursive marginalization on behalf of the state, most 
organizations put forth their involvement in different women’s networks and cooperation’s as the 
main strength and characteristic of the Serbian women’s movement, indicating that the national 
networks5 are not merely strategic responses to restricted resources but ways of containing the 
“Yugoslav feminist spirit” (AWC). National as well as transnational co-operation was seen as 
necessary in an environment where their feminist frames don’t resonate with government politics. 
Thus, it was not surprising that respondents were positive with regards to seeking transnational 
allies and expressed closeness to a European identity:  
 
Our integration with Europe is from the beginning of the year 1991. We are connected to 
alternative movements for change, peace and feminist initiatives. For me it is important to be part 
of that movement. I’m interested in that Europe, in the people and movements of Europe… (WIB)  
 
Some respondents, furthermore, witnessed to having strong relations with similar women’s NGOs 
across Europe (AWC; WIB; Women’s Studies BG; Women’s Studies NS). In the case of NLO, who 
experienced that their claims were marginalized also within the movement, cooperation with similar 
organizations in Slovenia and other European countries was put forth as a motivational framing. 
Likewise, the respondents welcomed the EU accession process from the point of view of providing 
political opportunities and exerting pressure on the Serbian state. The orientations towards Europe 
                                                
5 Network for Women in Black, Network for the European Women’s Lobby, Network for combating violence against 
women, Roma Women’s Network, Network for SOS phone Vojvodina. 
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were quite explicit, such as in the case of DAH Theatre, citing the Serbian government’s inability to 
choose a “clear pro-EU path”. In fact, all respondents asserted that “European values and norms” 
would do Serbia good. On the other hand, some were critical towards EU as a donor, partly because 
of the inaccessibility of EU funds and partly because they perceived that EU affects the agenda of 
local organizations that will risk “losing their activism” (Out of Circle, Women’s Space; NLO; 
NGO Pescanik, SOS Sombor; SOS Women’s Centre; WIB). Most respondents expressed an 
understanding of being in some kind of “moment of change” as their NGO could no longer function 
as a radical grass-roots organization but was neither evolved into a professionalized NGO (cf. 
Vráblíková & Cisar 2010). In relation to this, they welcomed EU influence through the accession 
negotiations while at the same time criticizing the EU for organizing their assistance so as to make 
local NGOs dependent on the Serbian government in receiving grants, something that was 
perceived to hinder their collective action instead of promoting it. These results are in line with 
previous findings on the ambivalent nature of EU accession assistance for women’s organizations in 
CEE countries and how EU as a donor ultimately affects both the agenda and the strategies of local 
women’s NGOs (Roth 2007; Haskova & Krizkova 2008). 
 
The Framing of Gender Equality and Social Change in EU Enlargement Policy 
As will be argued below, EU policy could gain leverage to movement claims in three main ways: 
firstly by emphasizing the prevalent corruption and through promoting deepened regional 
cooperation. Secondly through emphasizing and acknowledging the “hostile climate” for civil 
society organizations and thirdly by calling for implementation and political commitment in the 
area of human rights legislation. At the same time, however, EU policy could constrain movement 
framing through not providing detailed and corresponding prognosis in gender equality policy; 
concrete formulations on the level of adjustment to EU standards are generally left out. There is 
also a general lack of gender mainstreaming throughout the policy documents as well as a narrow 
definition of gender equality, which risks undermining the (Serbian) political commitments to 
gender equality.  
 
Corruption and Regional Cooperation 
Public administration reform is accentuated by EU policy as a solution to many problems associated 
with the prevalent corruption in Serbian society. The consistent emphasis on stable and transparent 
institutions discloses administrative reforms as intersecting to all other negotiations (2014a:20). The 
diagnostic framing in this area identifies for example how “laws are often passed without a 
sufficiently comprehensive assessment of the policy and budgetary impact, resulting into 
inefficiencies in the implementation and enforcement of legislation” (2014b:9). Prevalent 
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corruption in the Serbian society is largely framed as a problem of institutional quality that affects 
citizens’ access to public services such as education or health (2014a:11). The report also provides 
examples of lacking implementation of relevant anti-corruption strategies. One part of this framing 
concerns that politicians need to “fully enforce” the legal framework on corruption and also back 
these reforms with “appropriate resources” (2014b:12), another prognosis concerns the need to 
strengthen the capacities and resources of the Anti-Corruption Agency as well as establish “whistle-
blowing protection mechanisms” (2014a:33). Overall, the COM pressures Serbia in regards to 
‘build up a credible track record of investigations, prosecutions and convictions in cases of 
organized crime and corruption’ (2014a:19). Furthermore, the fight against corruption is described 
in relation to governing parties and the report brings up the failure of political organizations to 
provide information on expenses for the 2012 election campaign as a major problem (2014b:43). 
Similarly, another recurring diagnosis in the report was the unfavorable conditions for “independent 
regulatory bodies”. Here, some blame was attributed to the parliament as the report asserts the need 
for the parliament to improve its relationship to independent bodies (2014b:7). Nonetheless, a great 
deal of blame was directed towards the government for not enabling an effective work of 
independent regulatory bodies by systematically following up their recommendations (2014b:8). 
These assessments resonate with respondents’ description of corruption in Serbian society.  
In emphasizing regional cooperation and “good neighborly relations” as essential parts of 
Serbia’s progress towards EU (2014a:34), the report to some extent resonates with activist 
diagnostic framing of Serbia’s inability to handle the past. Although the general assessment is that 
Serbia actively participates in cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (2014b:16), the report underscores that Serbia needs to continue to actively participate 
in various initiatives relating to regional cooperation and “high-level dialogues”. The COM also 
stresses that the normalization process with Kosovo has slowed down and is in need of “new 
momentum” (2014b:6). In accentuating the importance of regional cooperation as a stabilizing 
force, the report possibly supports, quite indirectly, the anti-nationalist frames of Serbian feminist 
organizations. In the assessment of Serbian “war crimes jurisdictions”, the report announces that 
“the number of investigations against high-level officers still remains low, and courts continued to 
pass lenient sentences in such cases” (2014b:42-43). This quote indicates that the COM is aware of 
problems pertaining to “nationalist politics” in relation to reconciliation with the past.  
 
The Inclusion of Civil Society Actors and Implementation of Human Rights Legislation  
Another possibility for frame resonance is the COM criticism of government officials for not 
fulfilling their commitment to ensure the involvement of civil society in the accession process. A 
strong civil society is framed as crucial for the strengthening of democracy and political 
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accountability (2014a:20). If Serbia manages to increase the consultation of civil society actors 
throughout the reform process (2014b:11) it is thought to promote a smooth harmonization to EU 
standards within the political criteria. The environment for human rights defenders and CSOs is 
described as “hostile” especially for those articulating critical views (Ibid) and the report states that 
Serbia needs to address the problem of NGOs receiving threats from “extreme right-wing 
organizations” (2014b:47). These policy frames to some extent shed light on the marginalization of 
NGOs with critical voices, a fact that corresponds a great deal with activist diagnostic descriptions 
of the undemocratic tendencies of the Serbian government, exemplified by their exposed situation 
to extremist organizations. Overall, in relation to civil society, the COM compels Serbian 
authorities concerning the inclusion of CSOs as important “stakeholders” in the accession process 
by calling for a more “visible political commitment to promoting a culture of respect” and by 
ensuring that already existent instruments for including the civil society in the legislative process 
are actually implemented (2014b:11). This suggested prognosis might facilitate a greater visibility 
of CSOs in the implementation of EU standards since the report invokes the seriousness of the issue 
by highlighting the government’s aversion to critique.  
Furthermore, EU policy provides decisive accounts on the need to implement human rights 
legislation (2014a:13). Implementation issues are pointed to as particularly severe on local level and 
the assessment generally concludes the need for the anti-discrimination law to be further aligned in 
Serbian national laws (2014b:38). Likewise, the COM directs critique on the lacking follow-up of 
the Ombudsman (mechanism for protection of human rights) offices’ recommendations, identifying 
how especially those recommendations that require systematic changes are ignored by Serbian 
authorities (2014b:10). For this problem a specific solution is formulated: “the constitutional 
position of the Ombudsman needs strengthening, should be allocated sufficient resources and in 
general the offices independence need to be better respected and understood” (Ibid). The report, 
furthermore, recommends Serbia to issue an action plan for the implementation of the Istanbul 
Convention (preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence) (2014b:47). 
On these points (i.e. implementation in practice) EU policy resonates with activist claims on the 
“cosmetic” and rather superficial change of the Serbian government. EU discourse indicates, to a 
varying extent, that Serbian administrative capacity is weak in the implementation of gender 
equality because of the governments lacking will for change. However, on the other hand, the report 
only in bypassing states that the previous Directorate for Gender Equality has been “dismantled” 
and replaced by “a unit for gender equality” under the Ministry for Labour, Employment, Veterans 
and Social Policy (2014b:38). Serbian authorities thus managed to abolish the directorate as the 
main mechanism for gender equality, without EU policy condemning so.  
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Anti-Discrimination, Gender Equality and Human Rights 
In monitoring Serbian progress with regards to implementation of gender equality Acquis (chapter 
19 and 23) the lack of a detailed diagnosis and prognosis indicated that the assessment was overall 
positive. In chapter 23, for example, emphasis was put in areas related to the enforcement of an 
effective independent judiciary as well as the fight against corruption, whilst less attention was paid 
to the assessment of “fundamental rights”, which includes sections on women’s rights. In evaluating 
the “institutional compliance” (cf. Bretherton 2011) of gender equality Acquis the report 
accentuated the need for legislation to be “systematically enforced” with regards to preventing the 
dismissal of pregnant women, women on maternity leave or inequality in relation to employment 
and salaries (2014b:38). Nonetheless, the report also identified violence against women as an issue 
of gender inequality noting that the number of women being killed by their partners has increased 
(2014b:47). In relation to anti-discrimination and human rights, the report brings forth the holding 
of the pride parade as a “substantial step towards the effective exercise of human rights in general” 
(2014b:51). At the same time it also identified problems such as the prevailing discrimination of the 
LGBTI-community, in employment as well as in the society in large (2014b:48). With regards to 
Roma rights, Roma women and children were brought forth as the most discriminated against both 
in the labor market as well as in their families as violence repeatedly goes unreported (2014b:50). 
Areas such as education, housing and employment were particularly highlighted here and Serbia 
was recommended to improve the situation of the Roma minority by implementing the “Roma 
strategy” as well as strengthening “operational cooperation between the various ministries and 
bodies relevant for Roma inclusion” (Ibid). Thus, in highlighting Roma rights and LGBTI-rights 
gender aspects of these discriminations were generally excluded, with the exception of Roma 
women and girls being mentioned as the most discriminated against (2014b:50). The report 
identified the need to raise awareness on issues of discrimination against Roma, the LGBTI 
community as well as persons with HIV (2014b:37-38). EU policy thus recognizes the 
discrimination of Roma in various fields of social life and this is the case, although to a lesser 
extent, also for the LGBTI community. However, women were not portrayed as belonging to these 
“vulnerable groups” and few connections were drawn between these discriminations.  
 
The Implications of EU Enlargement Policy – Resonance and Discursive Opportunities? 
 
Radical Feminist Frames and the Discourse on Violence 
Movement actors framed the depoliticized environment of Serbia, resulting from poverty and a 
struggle to survive on a day-to-day basis, as political violence exerted by the state. Thus, what 
respondents described was to some extent lacking citizen rights. The oppression was seen as 
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twofold, both (patriarchal) oppression on “women” as a group but also an (authoritarian) oppression 
of Serbian citizens in general. In the Serbian case, patriarchy seems deeply interwoven with the 
experience of authoritarianism and nationalism. This is because, as claimed by Papic (2002), both 
genders have experienced similar processes of “disempowerment” since the beginning of the 90s. In 
fact, Papic (2002) has argued that the increased violence against women in the private sphere, 
which follows the same trend identified by Pollert (2003) in some CEE countries after 1989, is a 
result of the “equal” oppression of men and women in the public sphere where both genders became 
economically, legally and institutionally disempowered, i.e. the “equality” of living in a state of 
“despotic powerlessness” (2002:130). The discourse thus seeks to draw connections between the 
abuses of a women’s body in the home with the abuse of the symbolic representation of “women” 
in nationalist politics. The experience of war has undoubtedly complicated the “transition” 
experience in Serbia as well as the feminist framing of issues concerning violence against women.  
As there was more or less a consensus among respondents in viewing the state as a 
“common enemy” (cf. Gamson 2013), even among the more institutionalized forms of organizing 
(for example both of the Studies Centre’s who functioned as NGOs as well as institutionalized 
research centers), movement actors had indeed chosen a radical rather than resonant framing of 
claims (cf. Ferree 2003). The evidence of a master frame within the movement might be connected 
to some organizations perceiving that their issues, articulated with reference to more liberal ideas of 
empowerment and identity politics, were marginalized. The most obvious case here was NLO who 
organized activities to support the creation of a lesbian community – they felt marginalized in a 
Serbian context both because of the general culture but also because their claims did not always fit 
with the agenda of the women’s movement. Thus, although all respondents experienced their 
domestic political and discursive opportunities as closed, there were different types of radical 
claims articulated within the movement and the claims that did not resonate with the feminist 
frames on violence tended to be suppressed as a result of movement-internal power dynamics (cf. 
Ferree 2003).  
 
Boomerang Patterns despite Skepticism and Professionalization?  
Notwithstanding the low capacity and small size of their organization that the respondents testified 
to, they did put some hope to EU policy being able to offer new opportunities. This was manifested 
by their positive view on increased transnational cooperation and their existent involvement in 
“transnational advocacy networks” (Keck & Sikkink 1999) such as the EWL or the EU itself. AWC 
was among those organizations that regularly visited Brussels and as one of the largest women’s 
organizations took part in the process of issuing shadow reports. However, most organizations did 
not see lobbying towards the EU as their priority, primarily because a lack of capacities but also, I 
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would argue, due to a lacking awareness of the possibilities for change created by the accession 
process. Even though most respondents were unambiguous as to their positive assessment of a 
potential EU membership they exerted skepticism towards EU as a donor but also as a political 
entity, mainly because the EU was perceived to lack understanding of their context. Some hopes 
were, however, formulated on the accession process being a possibility to achieve increased 
visibility of their collective action frames, despite the process of professionalization that EU 
contributes to. Furthermore, there is some evidence of the respondents using EU to influence 
national politics in what has been called “boomerang patterns” (Keck & Sikkink 1999), despite their 
occasional skepticism towards the process. The case of domestic violence is illustrative here: the 
fact that it is mentioned in the progress report for Serbia is possibly a result of the lobbying of 
organizations such as AWC but also of violence against women being on the agenda of the EWL. 
The reframing of violence against women as an issue of human rights instead of as a feminist issue 
(Roth 2007) might explain that it is included in the enlargement agenda as the only area of “soft” 
gender equality policy. According to Roth (2007:470), there is a connection between this reframing 
of violence against women and the wave of NGOs created across CEE countries to handle the issue. 
The case of Serbia seems to be no exception. As Serbian women’s NGOs are involved in networks 
for combating violence against women both nationally and transnationally, it is no coincidence that 
the most noticeable boomerang pattern is within the field of domestic violence.  
 
EU Enlargement Policy - Discursive Opportunities versus Constraints  
In general, the narrow understanding of gender equality is illustrated by the lack of EU gender 
equality policy outside of Acquis “hard” legislation, a finding that is in accordance with earlier 
literature (Bretherton 2011; Haskova & Krizkova 2008). One important exception is the area 
violence against women, which can be seen as a point of resonance as well as a discursive 
opportunity that movement actors can make use of in order to pressure their government on issues 
of practical implementation, since EU policy explicitly states the need for implementation of 
relevant mechanisms within this area (COM 2014b:47). While the fact that the issue is raised at all 
signals its importance, the COM does not attempt an analysis as to why the number of women killed 
by their partners has increased. The section on violence against women can be seen as symptomatic 
for the way EU frames gender equality issues as instances of human rights. In Roth’s (2007:470) 
understanding, the reframing of violence against women as a human rights issue risks undermining 
its political potential since the structural understanding of patriarchy is lost, which would be in line 
with arguments of gender equality objectives being “co-opted” by other policy priorities (Stratigaki 
2004). The lack of a structural understanding of women’s position was also illustrated by the 
differences with regards to framing the political versus the economic criteria in enlargement policy; 
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the latter was more consistent in articulating a corresponding diagnosis/prognosis while both 
diagnosis and prognosis were vaguely formulated within the political criteria. This was also found 
in the case of Czech Republic where EU evaluation placed particular weight on economic reforms 
(Haskova & Krizkova 2008:169). The lack of a comprehensive analysis of gender inequality 
problems in the Serbian context can be seen as connected to the scarce application of gender 
mainstreaming, which also leads to vague prognosis in formulating EU conditionality. The report 
brings attention to minority rights, LGBTI-rights and women’s rights in varying degrees but the 
main problem is that it fails to draw connections between these discriminations. Yet, the fact that 
EU discourse has a clear stance on pressuring Serbia to implement anti-discrimination and gender 
equality legislation into national law does provide discursive opportunities for Serbian women’s 
organizations in lobbying their government.  
Outside the field of gender equality and anti-discrimination, the discursive opportunities 
offered local women’s NGOs are primarily those highlighting the “hostile” climate for Serbian civil 
society actors and those related to the framing of corruption as a huge problem. Policy frames and 
movement frames converged particularly concerning the inability of the government to handle 
critical views, which offers credit to activist claims of being marginalized by the state. The policy 
framing of civil society as crucial for a democratic development included increased cooperation 
between governmental bodies and civil society actors. As indicated above, some respondents were 
not convinced as to this “opportunity” since they viewed the promotion of cooperation between 
NGOs and governmental bodies as counter-productive. The movement actors witnessed to a 
tendency of governmental bodies to “put on a show” and use their expertise when EU is around, 
whilst in practice their suggestions and claims are continuously ignored. However, EU policy, in 
stressing the need to strengthen the role and capacities of CSOs, provides discursive opportunities 
for movement actors in criticizing their government for lacking interest and lacking capacities. 
Serbian women’s organizations can draw attention to the discrepancy between the discourse of the 
government and its practice – what Keck & Sikkink (1999:95) call “accountability politics” and EU 
policy frames can thus work in the direction of supporting these movement claims discursively. 
Consequently, movement actors have the opportunity to draw on the reports conclusion of 
corruption and lacking implementation of adopted legislation in order to expose the “cosmetic 
change” of the Serbian state in a typical boomerang pattern (Keck & Sikkink 1999). Furthermore, 
EU discourse to some extent also legitimates movement claims of Serbia having unresolved issues 
with the past. The tendency in the progress report to highlight the political criteria, in which good 
neighborly relations are seen as central for further negotiations, might be a sign of EU 
understanding the nationalist context and women’s organizations can possibly make their claims of 
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“dealing with the past” more effective by drawing on these discursive opportunities. In sum, the 
possibility of movement actors to draw on EU discourse to promote their own claims is related to 
existent EU gender equality legislation, but also on policy frames on Serbian corruption, policy 
frames on the need to strengthen the role and capacities of civil society actors as well as policy 
frames on the need for deepened regional cooperation.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper has engaged with social movement framing analysis to explore, on the one hand, claims 
among contemporary Serbian women’s organizations and, on the other hand, how EU enlargement 
policy could support the framing of claims made by movement actors. The analysis found that the 
EU enlargement strategy and progress report for Serbia on several points resonates with movement 
collective action frames. Above all, the EU discourse can gain leverage to the frames brought forth 
by Serbian women’s organizations concerning the prevailing corruption and the “cosmetic change” 
of the Serbian state, which is connected to its lacking will for change as also illustrated by the 
lacking cooperation with civil society actors. Additionally, EU enlargement discourse in 
highlighting the need for regional cooperation and reconciliation with the past, possibly supports the 
overall understanding among Serbian women’s groups of the nationalist political context. Thus, this 
paper has found that the EU is an important discursive opportunity structure for Serbian women’s 
NGOs, a concept that has only played a marginal role in analyzing the impact of EU candidacy for 
women’s movements. My findings show that frame analysis combined with a perspective of 
discursive opportunity structures can shed light on the broader cultural context for movement 
claims-making and how a transnational force such as the EU accession context, might facilitate 
movement framing and claims-making. As movement frames and EU policy frames resonate on 
several points, movement actors could draw on EU discourse in order to promote their own frames 
in their national context, in what has been described as boomerang patterns (Keck & Sikkink 1999).  
The empirical contribution of this paper is to shed some light on contemporary women’s 
organizing in Serbia, which has not been analyzed in relation to EU enlargement policy or from a 
social movement perspective. Serbian women’s organizations shared similar claims and their 
collective action frames were produced with reference to a radical feminist ideology. These feminist 
frames put them in a marginalized position vis-à-vis the state. The radical framing of claims was 
connected to many of the organizations’ and activists’ roots in anti-war activism (cf. Visnjic 2015) 
that has had a structuring effect (Bilic & Jankovic 2012) on contemporary feminist activism in 
Serbia. Due to the presence of a master frame, in the form of a feminist positioning against 
nationalism and militarism, some more liberal organizations focusing on issues of empowerment 
felt marginalized within the movement. All movement actors were however in great accordance in 
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viewing the state as an enemy, a fact that signals the need to make better use of transnational 
advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink 1999) such as the EU. Even though movement actors were 
open to transnational cooperation as well as “European norms and values” they also exerted a 
skepticism towards EU, which risks putting them in a position of not taking advantage of and 
adjusting their framing to available discursive opportunities. Consequently, a suggestion for further 
research is to explore to what extent radical women’s groups in Serbia or other former Yugoslav 
countries make use of the EU or other transnational advocacy networks in order to facilitate their 
claims. Moreover, further research is needed in order to fully explore the characteristics of the 
Serbian women’s movement, their framing of claims as well as their strategies for survival, which 
would also be interesting to compare with women’s movements in other former Yugoslav countries 
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Appendix - List of conducted interviews 
 
• Autonomous Women’s Centre (Autonomni  ženski centar), Belgrade. 
• Women in Black (Žene u crnom), Belgrade.  
• Out of circle Vojvodina (Iz kruga Vojvodina), Novi Sad.  
• SOS Women’s Centre (SOS Ženski Centar), Novi Sad.  
• Women’s Space (Ženski Prostor), Niš.  
• SOS Sombor, Sombor.  
• Novi Sad Lesbian Organization (Novosadska lezbejska organizacija), Novi Sad.   
• Women’s Studies (Centar za ženske studije), Belgrade.  
• Women’s Studies (Ženske studije & istraživanja), Novi Sad.  
• Dah Theatre Research Centre (Dah teatar za pozorišna istraživanja), Belgrade.  
• NGO Pescanik (Udruženje žena peščanik), Kruševac.  
 
 
 
 
